However, FT make their argument by means of a continuous-time model using unconventional mixed strategies, which are motivated by discrete-time limits, but lack a formal link to discrete-time versions of the game. 3 That link will be established here. In general, the interest in the relation between limits of discrete-time games and games framed in continuous time, which has recently been investigated for different classes of games, 4 is due to the following dilemma. A continuous-time model may be desirable by the promise to apply convenient analytic methods, or because it seems unnatural to restrict the timing of actions in a given problem. However, one often encounters conceptual problems to define reasonable strategies in continuous time, or equilibrium existence may be lost, which is typical for timing games.
A general modeling issue for timing games is the flip side of the intuitive preemption argument: which strategies can actually support an equilibrium of early stopping at the point where the firms are indifferent between the leader and follower roles. A firm is only willing to adopt at that point if any hesitation would result in being preempted, because the payoff to the leader (L) is increasing at that point, see time T 1 in Figure 1 . There cannot be simultaneous adoption, which is the worst outcome (M ). Thus, the respective other firm must use a strategy that induces adoption "immediately after" the indifference point T 1 if no adoption has occured at T 1 (or before), which in continuous time can only mean adopting at a rate on an interval from T 1 . That rate would have to be infinite if the associated probability of getting the follower payoff (F ) was to compensate the increase in L, so there is no preemption equilibrium in conventional distributions over time. 5 FT let the firms instead place "atoms" α(t) ∈ (0, 1) on every t ∈ (T 1 , T * 2 ) and interpret these as conditional adoption probabilities. Requiring the atoms to be a continuous function of time, the outcome at t is defined to be that from playing an infinite sequence of constant probabilities α(t). The analogy with discrete-time models is only illustrated by a simpler example (a "grab-the-dollar" coordination game with monotone payoffs). As equilibria of games in discrete time are very sensitive to the last period (like the prisoners' dilemma or the chain store paradox), the relation of their proposed solution to limits of actual discrete-time versions of the game is not clear.
In Section 3 we show that there is a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium if the adoption times are confined to any discrete grid (Proposition 3.1). For any sequence of grids that become arbitrarily fine, the equilibrium distribution over outcomes does converge to the preemption equilibrium outcome distribution proposed by FT (in any subgame, Theorem 3.2).
In particular, the equilibrium payoffs in any subgame with L(t) ≥ F (t) converge to F (t) and immediate adoption by at least one firm occurs, whereas the payoffs in any subgame with
, where the first adoption occurs, with probability 1 /2 by either firm. Concerning the strategies, for any fixed t ∈ R + and l ∈ N, the adoption probabilities in the first l periods after t converge uniformly to α(t) and thus the limit interpretation of FT is valid. In particular, for any t ∈ (T 1 , T * 2 ) the limit is
and by hesitating for a positive amount of time, any firm would be preempted immediately in the limit and become follower. As waiting must also be optimal given the fully mixed strategies, the payoff must be that of the follower.
The analysis leading to this result is based on the dynamics of the equilibrium continuation values that are implied by the indifference condition from playing a mixed strategy in any equilibrium. A general key insight from this analysis is that the continuation values are nondecreasing in time where F > M (Lemma 5.2). Further, where L > F , the limit of the continuation values at time t cannot lie in (F, L) (Lemma 5.4), so the limit must be F .
In discrete time there are additional equilibria in which the firms take turns of adopting in periods with a first-mover advantage. Whether there is a limit outcome at some t (even in payoffs, for t ∈ (T 1 , T * 2 )) depends strongly on the sequence of grids and on who starts with adopting on any grid. There are also continuous-time equilibria that are not limits from discrete time. FT show that preemption can be avoided in Case B in Figure 1 by firms agreeing on any joint adoption date in [S,T 2 ]. 6 These are equilibria in pure strategies.
Although FT allow the firms to use conventional continuous-time mixed strategies -distribution functions G(t) over time -they miss some subgame perfect equilibria using such strategies in their equilibrium classification. In Section 4 below, Theorem 4.1 exhibits equi-6 Such equilibria could however be obtained as limits of ε-equilibria with ε 0 as the period length vanishes.
libria using nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria, the firms also coordinate on late joint adoption after S. From some arbitrary earlier point between T 1 and S on, however, each firm thinks that the other will adopt in the next instant with a certain small probability, and not after S. The associated risk of becoming follower balances the increase in L and thus adoption becomes as good as waiting.
This principle holds although L is not monotone. It also does not depend on the specific payoff processes L, F and M here, but works much more generally for other nonmonotone processes. Therefore, the equilibrium verification step for Theorem 4.1 is formulated as a separate Proposition 5.5 with all requirements on L, F and M in its statement, to be found in Section 5 that contains all proofs.
The model
As in FT, we start with their basic technology adoption model and derive payoffs L(t), F (t) and M (t) that accrue if t is the first time of adoption, on which the subsequent analysis will be based. Consider two firms having the option to adopt some available new technology. The cost of adopting at time t ∈ R + is c(t) and falling over time. Before adopting, a firm earns the revenue π 0 (m) per unit of time, where m is the number of firms already having adopted; it switches to π 1 (m) by adoption. Revenues are discounted continuously at the rate r > 0, whereas c is already discounted to t = 0. Thus, if firms i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j adopt at times t i , t j ∈ R + , the payoff to firm i is
It is assumed that
i.e. the gain of the first adopter exceeds that of the second, and adopting does not increase the revenue of the other firm.
If firm j is the only adopter by time t j ∈ R + , an optimal adoption time for the other firm i maximizes V (t i , t j ) over t i ≥ t j , which is equivalent to maximizing
over all feasible times τ ≥ t. Assume that (2.2) is strictly quasiconcave in τ ∈ R + and has a maximum at some T * 2 > 0 (implied by Assumption 2 on c in FT). Thus the unique optimal time to adopt in [t j , ∞) is max(T * 2 , t j ). Therefore, if t ∈ R + is the first time at which any firm adopts, then the payoff to firm i given an optimal follower reaction in continuous time is
if firm i is the only first adopter and thus the leader, F (t) := V (T * 2 ∨ t, t) if firm j is the only first adopter and i the follower, and M (t) := V (t, t) if simultaneous adoption occurs.
by uniqueness of the latter and π 1 (1) > π 1 (2), respectively. We will use the following further properties that are stylized in Figure 1 and implied by Assumption 2 on c in FT. L, F and M are continuous. There is a point
, L is strictly quasiconcave and has a maximum at some point T * 1 . Finally, M is strictly quasiconcave and has a maximum at some point T 2 ≥ T * 2 . 7
Equilibria in discrete time
Consider a family of grids {T N ; N ∈ N}, where each grid is a strictly increasing and unbounded sequence of time points, i.e.
Assume that the grids are ordered by decreasing mesh size and that the mesh gets arbitrarily fine, i.e.
The payoffs at the first time of adoption are as follows if the adoption times are restricted to the grid T N . First, simultaneous adoption at any
. Now the feasible adoption times for a firm that becomes follower at
. By strict quasiconcavity, (2.2) is maximized over all τ ∈ T N (only) by some endpoint of the interval [t N l , t N l+1 ) that contains T * 2 . Denoting that point by T * N 2 , an optimal adoption time for the follower is max(T * N 2 , t N k+1 ). Thus, the follower payoff is
and the leader payoff is
Note that we can have
for at most one t N k ∈ T N by strict quasiconcavity of (2.2), which must be T * N 2 or its predecessor. Note also that
as there are fewer possibilities to optimize on the grid.
The following properties will be used for the equilibrium determination. Recall that M (t) is strictly quasiconcave and has a maximum at someT
<T N 2 and strictly decreasing for t N k >T N 2 . L N , on the contrary, need not resemble L as much due to the follower reaction varying with the period length. A general property is that
as the difference is the value of the monopoly markup
In the timing game on any grid T N we focus on the adoption decisions as long as no firm has adopted and determine payoffs at the first time of adoption by the processes L N , F N and M N . A behavioral strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is thus a sequence
is the probability with which firm i adopts at time t N k ∈ T N if no firm has adopted before. Given a behavioral strategy for each firm i, the strategy profile is denoted
) and the associated expected payoff to firm i at time t N k if no firm has adopted, yet, is denoted by 
Adoption is uniquely optimal if the LHS exceeds the RHS, and waiting in the opposite case.
The equilibria in Proposition 3.1 are constructed by backward iteration from times t N k+1 > T * N 2 at which adoption is dominant, so
, so adoption must occur in all such periods, too. In that equilibrium, both firms i, j ∈ {1, 2} adopt immediately with probability 1 in any period
Otherwise, the firms adopt with probability
The convergence analysis for the symmetric equilibria as N → ∞ uses the following facts.
As for the continuous-time model sketched in Figure 1 , the equilibrium payoffs are at least F N , 
Equilibria with mixed strategies in continuous time
As in FT, a mixed strategy for firm i ∈ {1, 2} for the game in continuous time is a family
on R + putting no weight on [0, t), respectively, and that are time consistent in the sense of Bayes' law, i.e. that satisfy
denote possible jumps due to atoms. Given any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, and a mixed strategy profile (G 1 , G 2 ), the payoff to firm i in the subgame beginning at t ∈ R + is
The profile (G 1 , G 2 ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if there is no t ∈ R + at which some firm
by choosing any other distribution function than G t i that puts no weight on [0, t), i.e. if for all t ∈ R + , (G t 1 , G t 2 ) is an equilibrium. Consider Case B in Figure 1 , i.e. M (T 2 ) ≥ L(T * 1 ), so that there are dates at which joint adoption gives a higher payoff than any leader payoff before. S is the first time that joint adoption is at least as profitable as any earlier leader payoff. FT show that it is a subgame perfect equilibrium to fix any date in [S,T 2 ] and to adopt immediately from this date on, and claim that the only alternative equilibria would be preemption.
The following Theorem 4.1 identifies additional equilibria using nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria, the firms also coordinate on a late joint adoption date T after S. From some arbitrary earlier point T 0 ∈ [T 1 , S] on, however, the firms start adopting at a rate that depends on (cumulative) increases in L. The associated risk to become follower makes the firms indifferent to adopt when L is setting new records.
The principle behind Theorem 4.1 does not depend on the given payoff processes L, F and M , in particular not on monotonicity. Therefore, the equilibrium verification step is formulated as a separate Proposition 5.5 in Section 5, with all requirements on L, F and M in its statement.
Proofs
The following lemma shows that the preemption equilibrium from FT cannot be sustained by strategies that are distribution functions over continuous time, see fn. 5.
Lemma 5.1. For any ε ∈ (0, T 1 − T * 2 ),
and L(t) > F (t), so
Note that similarly the result obtains more generally if there are λ > −1 and δ
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We first argue that both firms must adopt immediately when-
Thus, L N must have a maximum when restricted to that set and also one on the set T N ∩ (T * N 2 , ∞) that has finitely many elements more. LetT N 1 denote the latest time at which L N attains its maximum on the latter set.
Then it holds at t
) for all strategy profiles σ N and firms
by strict quasiconcavity of (2.2). Thus, adopting is uniquely optimal at 
, and by iteration immediate adoption must occur at any t N k ∈ (T * N 2 ,T N 1 ]. The same argument applies to T N ∩ (T N 1 , ∞) and so forth, to yield immediate adoption and
) by (5.1) and the firms must adopt immediately.
) by strict quasiconcavity of (2.2) and thus t N k+1 ≥ T * N 2 by (3.1), so at any such
) by (5.1). Then the LHS in (3.2) exceeds the RHS unless σ N j (k) = 1, meaning that both firms must adopt in any symmetric equilibrium.
It remains to work backwards through the initial periods at which
) at the last of them. Considering (3.2), in equilibrium firm i can only adopt in any of these periods if
). In particular, if the latter binds, firm i can only adopt if σ N j (k) = 0, so also σ N i (k) = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium.
, firm i is indifferent only if (3.3) holds, the RHS of which now is in (0, 1). For any smaller (greater) σ N j (k), firm i must adopt (wait). Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium, σ N 1 = σ N 2 must be given by (3.3), which plugged into (3.2) yields the payoff (3.
). To prove Theorem 3.2, first three lemmas are established. A crucial fact for taking the limits of the symmetric equilibria as N → ∞ is that the value processes V i σ N (·) are nondecreasing and dominating F N (·) up to T * N 2 . In particular we then have
Proof. It suffices to show that
The derivative of that term w.r.t.
by (3.1). If
) as just established. (As a side product this proves also that
.) The discrete-time payoff processes converge as follows to their continuous-time counterparts. M N converges uniformly to M as N → ∞ in the sense that sup{|M N (t N k )−M (t N k )|; k ∈ N 0 } → 0, because this sequence is identically 0. L N converges in the same notion, though not trivially. F N converges pointwise if one considers the grid points close to a fixed time t ∈ R + , and so do L N and M N , too.
Proof. The first claim follows from sup{|L
only by the revenue π 1 (1) − π 1 (2) between disagreeing follower reaction times, which is for at most one period.
For F N also the cost c matters. To obtain pointwise convergence, fix some t ∈ R + and choose for each grid T N the periods satisfying t N k ≤ t < t N k+1 . Then
The adoption times differ again by at most one period,
An immediate consequence of Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 is that lim inf N V i σ N (t) ≥ F (t) for any t ∈ R + . The following lemma shows that due to the increments of V i σ N (·) implied by (3.4), any cluster point above F (t) must imply an immediate jump above L(t) and thus the lim sup would have to stay above L. The latter will subsequently be shown to be impossible given the boundedness of 
Proof. Suppose that for some
. We first show that any subsequence of V i σ N (·) N that converges to the cluster point C at t must have a lim inf immediately to the right of t not less than L(t), as otherwise there would be some interval after t in which the increments of V i σ N (·) given by (5.2) are bounded away from 0 as they become arbitrarily frequent. Therefore, choose arbitrary 0 < ε < min(L(t)−C, C −F (t)) and 0 < δ < min(ε, T * 2 − t) such that |F (s) − F (t)| < ε and |L(s) − L(t)| < ε for all |s − t| ≤ δ by continuity. By monotonicity of V i σ N (·), any subsequence converging to the cluster point C at t must have a lim inf not below C at t + δ. Suppose by way of contradiction that one has a cluster point D < L(t)−ε. For any subsequence converging both to C at t and D at t+δ, V i σ N (t) is arbitrarily close to C and V i σ N (t + δ) arbitrarily close to D for all N sufficiently large, and so max (V 
given by (5.2) are positive and bounded away from 0 for all t N k , t N k+1 ∈ [t, t + δ] for all N sufficiently large, and there are arbitrarily many of them in that interval as T N → 0, which contradicts that V i σ N (t + δ) has the cluster point D. As ε was arbitrary, the lim inf at any s > t of any subsequence of V i σ N (·) that converges to the cluster point C at t cannot be below L(t).
By continuity of L(·) and F (·) and monotonicity of all
V i σ N (·) this implies that if ever lim sup N V i σ N (t) > F (t) for some t with L(t) > F (t), then lim sup N V i σ N (s) ≥ L(s) for all s > t with L(s) > F (s).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. By Lemma 5.4, if lim sup
is nondecreasing, and for t N k ≤ s = T * 2 < t N k+1 one of the two grid points is the first time that
, which converges to M (T * 2 ). Therefore we must have lim sup N V i σ N (t) = F (t) for all t ∈ R + with L(t) > F (t) and thus convergence by lim inf N V i σ N (t) ≥ F (t). The same argument shows convergence for t = T 1 , because if lim sup N V i σ N (t) > F (t) for t = T 1 , then this would also hold for some t > T 1 with L(t) > F (t) by continuity of F (·).
By continuity of the limit in t and monotonicity of
and fixed l ∈ N. Therefore, and by Lemma 5.3,
where
for all N sufficiently large and thus
) for all N sufficiently large by Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 and thus σ N i (k) = 0 and
for all s ≤ t. As t < T 1 was arbitrary and F (t) increases continuously to
, as t N k+l < t for sufficiently large N , which implies σ N i (k + l) = 0 as argued before. The verification of the equilibria from Theorem 4.1 does not depend on the particular properties of L, F and M from Section 2. Therefore, these may be any functions of time in the following Proposition 5.5, which is applied in the subsequent proof of Theorem 4.1. Recall the notation G t i (u−) := lim s u G t (s) and ∆G t i (u) = G t i (u) − G t i (u−) that will be used for any monotone function.
Proposition 5.5. Consider any times
is an equilibrium for the subgame beginning at T ∈ R + with symmetric payoffs
Then the mixed strategies G t 1 and G t 2 satisfying Letting τ G j := inf{u ∈ R + | G t j (u) = 1}, V (u, G t j ) is constant for u > τ G j . First consider G t j (T −) = 1, so in fact The payoffs for t < S are as claimed by Proposition 5.5. If max(t, T 0 ) ≥ T * 1 , we have G t 1 (S−) = 0 and the equilibrium payoff at S is M (S) = L(S). If max(t, T 0 ) < T * 1 , G t 1 increases continuously before S as L does on [0, T * 1 ], which implies also L * (t ∨ T 0 ) = L(t ∨ T 0 ).
